mercoledì 25 giugno 2014

uscire dall'illusione del Tao

L'ultimo argomento trattato da Charles T. Tart nella seconda parte di Stati di Coscienza riguarda i modi per uscire dallo stato di illusione della coscienza consensuale ordinaria:

Speculation



The discussion in Chapter 19 involves a value judgment that should be made more explicit: being in clear contact with external reality is good; being in poor contact with it is bad. This statement should not be overgeneralized: there is nothing wrong, for example, with deliberately becoming absorbed in a good movie and deliberately ignoring those aspects of reality that are inconsistent with enjoying the movie. It is undesirable, on the other hand, to believe you are in good contact with reality when you are not.
I think most readers will have difficulty accepting Chapter 19 on more than an intellectual level. In some of our bad moments we may be unhappy with the ordinary d-SoC, but generally we seem pleased. Feeling happy is a function of a viable culture. If the culture is to survive, the majority of its members must feel contented with what they are doing and feel they are carrying out a meaningful function in life. Whether we generally feel happy or not, however, my personal observations and understanding of much of the research findings of modern psychology have convinced me that the analysis of ordinary consciousness as samsara is basically true. The present chapter is based on the assumption that it is true and is concerned with ways out of a state of illusion. It is not a guide to "enlightenment," for that is both inappropriate in the context of the present volume and beyond the reach of my competence.
Why, then, would you or I or anyone want to escape from the samsaric state that is our ordinary state of consciousness? the exact answer varies for every individual, but in general there is a mixture of cultural, personal, and growth/curiosity reasons.
A major function of a culture is to provide a consensus reality that not only deals adequately with the physical world about it but also produces a psychologically satisfactory life for the majority of its members. Each of us needs to feel that he belongs and that his life has meaning in terms of some valued, larger scheme of things. So every society has a mythos, a set of explicit and implicit beliefs and myths about the nature of reality and the society's place in it, that makes the activities of the people in that society meaningful. The mythos that has sustained dour society for so long, largely the Judeo-Christian ethic, is no longer a very satisfactory mythos for many people. Similarly, the rationalism or scientism or materialism that tried to replace the religious mythos of our society has also turned out to be unsatisfactory for a large number of people. So we are faced with disruptions and conflicts in our society has also turned out to be unsatisfactory for a large number of people. So we are faced with disruptions and conflicts in our society as people search consciously or unconsciously for more satisfying values. Our wheels of life, to continue the analogy of Figure 19-2, are not rolling along smoothly through our consensus reality. There are too many flat spots on the wheel that produce unpleasant jolts, and too many pieces of broken glass and potholes in the road of our consensus reality. So the ride is no longer comfortable.
Personal reason for desiring a way out may involve initial poor enculturation, so we don't fit in well, knowledge of other cultural systems that seem advantageous in certain ways, and/or hope that a more satisfactory substitute can be found for our faulty culture. Various kinds of personal discontent make it difficult or impossible for an individual to find meaning in his life within the consensus reality of the culture. If he acts out these discontents, he may be classified as neurotic or psychotic, as a criminal, or as a rebel, depending on his particular style. If he acts out in a way that capitalizes on widespread cultural discontent, he may be seen as a reformer or pioneer. Or, he may outwardly conform to the mores of contemporary society but be inwardly alienated.
Finally, a person may want to escape for what I call growth/curiosity reasons, a healthy curiosity or desire to know. He may be able to tolerate the limitations and dissatisfactions of the culture around him and cope satisfactorily with it, and yet really want to know what lies outside that consensus reality, what other possibilities exist. He may see the limitations of the current worldview and want to know what worldviews could replace it or whether it can be modified.
I emphasize scientific curiosity in this book, the desire to understand coupled with realization that science is an excellent tool for gaining understanding. But even those of us who seek larger scientific understanding are also motivated by cultural and personal forces.

Are There Ways Out?

A major intellectual theme in the Western world lately has been that there are no ways out. Seeing the irrationality and horror, the samsaric nature of much of the world about us, some philosophers have concluded that this simply is human nature and that the best we can hope to do is tolerate it in existential despair or try, without much hope, to do the best we can. Indeed, a person can use such despair as a prop for the ego by priding himself on his "realism" and courage in facing such a dismal situation. While I respect these philosophies of despair for their honest recognition that there is no easy way out, I am of an optimistic nature myself and cannot accept despair as an end goal.
More importantly, my studies of people's experiences in various d-ASCs have convinced me that people can and do have vital, living experiences that are ways out. People have what Maslow {36} called peak experiences of openness, freedom, and belonging in which they feel they transcend, at least temporarily, the samsaric condition of ordinary consciousness. It can be argued that these experiences are just other illusions, that there is no freedom. But the belief that a way out does not exist may be just as illusory.
When the search for a way out is triggered by discontent with the ordinary d-SoC, a common reaction is to blame your discontent on some particular aspect of yourself or your society and look for ready-made solutions. There are thousands of leaders and groups who have ready-made solutions to sell you or give you—a multitudes of-isms and-ologies. Give yourself to Jesus, join this commune, join political party X and remake the world, support the revolution, the truth is now revealed through yogi Z, eat your way to enlightenment with organic foods, find health and happiness with a low-cholesterol (or a high-cholesterol) diet, live in foreign country K where nobody hassles you.
This is not meant to imply a blanket criticism of all communities, political and social ideas, or spiritual systems: indeed, in Transpersonal Psychologies I attempt to promote the psychologies inherent in spiritual disciplines because of their great value. Most of the-isms and-ologies being offered contain valuable techniques for personal growth, ideas and techniques that can help you get out. But, when you motive for escape stems from a momentary discomfort with your present consensus reality, from a feeling that your wheel of life has too many flat spots and is hitting too many bumps, you may be seeking not radical change in your self as the root cause of your problems, but simply a more satisfactory belief system, a rounder wheel, and a nicely protected consensus reality that has no bumps. Any tool for personal or spiritual growth that humanity has ever devised can be perverted from its original function and used for simply making a person feel comfortable. Too often, a person is not really interested in looking more directly at reality, he simply wants his current samsaric wheel of life, the structures of his mind, overhauled or replaced with a new set that provides many good feeling sand hardly any bad feelings.

Figure 20-1. Development of samsaric consciousness with positive rather than negative emotional tone. As in Figure 19-1, internal processes soon overwhelm perception and are mistaken for perception.
Figure 20-1 is a revision of Figure 19-1, used to illustrate the concept of samsara. The content of the associational chains that are activated is altered, and the tone of the emotional energies is changed from negative to positive, and so the person's experience is positive. The labels on the figure make it self-explanatory. Still, all that happens in reality is that a stranger walks up and says, "Hi, my name is Bill." But this time the person, who we can call Sara, becomes extremely happy as a result and feels very good about herself. Yet she is as much in a state of illusion, samsara, as she was before. She has a set of internal structures, internal machinery, that make her feel good, but she is no more in touch with reality than before.

D-ASCs as Ways Out

Since the ordinary d-SoC is the creator and maintainer of consensus reality on a personal level, and since the sharing of similar, ordinary, "normal" d-SoCs by others is the maintainer of the consensus reality on a social level, one way out of samsara is to enter a d-ASC, spend as much time there as possible, and get all your friends into that d-ASC too. You would choose a d-ASC or d-ASCs you valued, where you felt "high." To many people today the solution to the discomfort of current reality seems to be to get high and stay high.
Many of us are currently fascinated with the possibilities of being happy or solving our problem by entering into various d-ASCs, using chemical or nonchemical means. We have not yet learned to estimate realistically the costs of this route. We know the costs of chronic alcohol use, but seem willing to tolerate them. We do not know the costs of other d-ASCs very well. Consensus realities can exist and be created in various d-ASCs. The explanation of ordinary consciousness as samsara may well apply in d-ASCs such as drunkenness or marijuana intoxication. In other d-ASCs, such as meditative states, samsaric illusion may be less common, but this has not yet been shown scientifically.
We tend to get into what John Lilly calls "overvaluation spaces"; we tend to be carried away by the contrast between our experience of the d-ASC and the ordinary d-SoC, and so overvalue the d-ASC. I think this is largely a function of novelty or need motivated blindness. Especially if we have taken a risk, such as using illegal drugs, to attain a d-ASC, we have a need to convince ourselves that the experience was worthwhile.
Further discussion of the costs of various d-ASCs seems to me premature. The immense amount of cultural hysteria and propaganda in this area gives us distorted and mostly false views of what the costs are, and we must work through this and build up some scientific knowledge before we can talk adequately about costs and benefits of d-ASCs.
The values of experiencing and working in d-ASCs can b exceptionally high. But, as is true of all the many tools that have been devised for human growth, a d-ASC's value depends on how well it is used. Experiencing a d-ASC carries no guarantee of personal betterment. Achieving a valuable d-ASC experience depends on what we want, how deeply and sincerely we want it, what conflicting desires we have, how much insight we have into ourselves, and how well prepared we are to make use of what we get in the d-ASC. There is a saying in many spiritual traditions: "He who tastes, knows." The process is not that automatic. A truer saying is: "He who tastes has an opportunity to know."
In the d-ASCs we know much about scientifically, the experiencer can be in a samsaric condition, involved in a personal or a consensus reality that is cut off from reality, even though its style is different, interesting, or productive of greater happiness than the ordinary d-SoC.
Techniques exist, however, that are intended to free a person's awareness from the dominance of the structure, of the machinery that has been culturally programmed into him. In terms of the radical view of awareness, whatever basic awareness ultimately is, there are techniques that at least produce the experience of freeing awareness partially or wholly from the continual dominance of structure, of moving toward a freer, more wide-ranging awareness rather than a consciousness that is primarily a function of the automated structure pattern of consensus reality. Let us consider the general categories into which these techniques fall, remembering that any discussion of their ultimate usefulness is beyond current science.
The first step in using any of these techniques is to recognize that there is a problem. Assume, therefore, that an individual, through self-observation, has acquired enough experiential knowledge of his samsaric condition to know that he needs to and want to do something. Although there are many religious definitions of what a clear or higher state of consciousness simply as one in which external reality is recognized more for what it is, less distorted by internal processes.

Discriminative Awareness

One way to begin to escape from the samsaric condition is to pay enough directed attention to your mental processes so that you can distinguish between primary perception coming in from the external world and associational reaction to it. We tend to assume that we do this naturally, but I believe it is rare. This may be done by understanding how your associational structures are built and how they generally operate, thus distinguishing associational reactions on a content basis, and/or by getting a general experiential "feel" for a quality that distinguishes associational reactions. If you can keep your primary perception and your reactions to it clearly distinguished in your consciousness, you are less likely to project your reactions to stimuli onto the environment and others or to distort incoming perception to make your perceptions consistent with internal reactions.
I have found, from both personal observation and indications in the psychological literature that making this discrimination, putting a fairly high degree of awareness on the beginnings of the associational process, tend to undercut their ability to automatically stimulate other associational chains and thus activate emotions. You need not do anything in particular to the association, just be clearly aware that it is an associational reaction. The situation is analogous to being on your good behavior when you know others are watching, whether or not those others are doing anything in particular to influence your behavior.

A Watchman at the Gate

If you refer to Figure 19-1 and 20-1, you will notice the label, DEROPP'S "WATCHMAN AT THE GATE" ENTERS HERE. The analogy taken from DeRopp's book {15}, is to a watchman at the city gate (the senses) who knows that certain slums in the city of the mind have outbursts of rioting when certain mischievous characters (stimulus patterns) are allowed into the city. The watchman scrutinizes each traveler who comes up and does not admit those he knows will cause rioting. If you have a good understanding of your associational and reaction patterns, your prepotent needs, and the particular kinds of stimuli that set them off, you can maintain an attentive watchfulness on your primary perception. When you realize that an incoming stimulus is the sort that will trigger an undesirable reaction, you can inhibit the reaction. It is easier to become self-conscious, and thus remove some of the energy from incoming stimuli before they have activated associational chains and prepotent needs, than to stop the reactions once they have been activated.
To a certain extent the practice of discriminative awareness, described above, performs this function. Setting up the watchman, however, provides a more specialized discrimination, paying special attention to certain troublesome kinds of stimuli and taking more active measure when undesirable stimuli are perceived. The watchman robs the reaction of its power early enough to prevent it from gaining any appreciable momentum; discriminative awareness allows the reaction to tap into various prepotent needs, even though the continuous observation of it lessens identification and so takes away some of its power.

Nonattachment

A classical technique in the spiritual psychologies for escaping from samsara is the cultivation of nonattachment, learning to "look neutrally" on whatever happens, learning to pay full attention to stimuli and reactions but not to identify with them. The identification process, the quality added by the operation of the Sense of Identity subsystem discussed in Chapter 8, adds a great deal of energy to any psychological process. Without it, these processes have less energy and therefore make less mischief.
Vipassana meditation is a specific practice of nonattachment performed in the technically restricted meditative setting. Recall that the instructions (Chapter 7) are to pay attention to whatever happens, but not to try to make anything in particular happen or to try to prevent anything in particular from happening. The idea is neither to welcome nor reject any particular stimulus or experience. This is quite different from the ordinary stance toward events, where a person seeks out and tries to pleasant ones. Meditation, as Naranjo {39} points out, is a technically simplified situation: a person removes himself from the bustle of the world to make learning easier. But it is also designed to teach nonattachment so the practice can be transferred to everyday life.
If one is successful in practicing nonattachment, the machinery of the mind runs when stimulated, but does not automatically grab attention/awareness so readily; reactions and perceptions do not become indiscriminately fused together; and attention/awareness energy remains available for volitional use.
These are two clear ways in which the practice of nonattachment can be flawed. Often a person believes that he is unaffected by certain things, that he just is not interested in them or that they do not bother him. This apparent indifference, however, actually comes from an active inhibitory process that takes place outside that focus of awareness. So he is really up-tight even if he does not feel it. Self-observation and/feedback from others is a corrective for this. Effective growth practices can thus promote unhappiness and upset by breaking through an inhibitory layer before being able to work on the disturbances themselves.
The other flaw is that while nonattachment may free a person from the habitual loss of attention/awareness energy to the machinery of the mind, the machinery is still there. He no longer automatically identifies with the machinery; it no longer forcibly grabs his attention/awareness, but the machinery itself, while dormant, has not been dismantled. What happens if he is put in totally new circumstances in which he has not practiced nonattachment?
Recall that once the machinery of the mind is activated, it grabs attention/awareness energy, and after this, control may be difficult or impossible. Totally new circumstances may activate the previously inactive structures in novel ways so that they cannot be stopped. A person may be unaware that the machinery has begun operating, so it can grab his attention/awareness energy and plunge him into a samsaric state again. This appears to have happened, for example, to some Indian yogis who began living in the West. Their practice of nonattachment as a principal discipline in India had enabled them to achieve a special serenity of mind, but this was under particular cultural circumstances. As one example, yogis and holy men are treated as nonsexual beings in India. Thus women may worship them, but in a completely nonsexual way. When they come to the West and are besieged in a sexual way by beautiful young girls, the yogis, lacking practice in handling this, are subject to strongly activated samsaric mechanisms.

Dismantling Structures

The above techniques are mindfulness techniques, involving an increase in awareness of what is happening and how one is reacting to it, usually with some discipline, such as nonattachment, practiced in conjunction with this increased awareness. To some extent, these mindfulness techniques can actually dismantle some of the structures of the mind. This happens in two ways. First, some structures seem to need to operate in the dark; they cannot continue to operate when one is fully conscious of what is happening. Thus, insight into the nature of a structure results in its partial or full dissolution. Second, some structures and combinations of structures seem to need to be activated periodically to maintain their integrity. By practices like the watchman at the gate or nonattachment, which do not allow energy to flow freely into them, they are starved and gradually lose their integrity, Gurdjieff's technique of self-observation, for example, involves paying full attention to one's reactions without making any attempt to change them. Many people practicing self-observation have had the experience of watching an undesirable reaction occur repeatedly, then weakly and later not at all, even though the requisite stimulus occurs.
Many structures and subsystems are an intimate part of a person's enculturated personality, however, and are not only highly resistant to change by insight, but may be incapable of being perceived well at all. They are so connected to prepotent needs and defense mechanisms that they cannot be observed clearly, or else they are so implicit that they are outside awareness. They are never observed, so observation and mindfulness techniques do not work.
Here is where Western-developed psychotherapy becomes exceptionally valuable. Through feedback and pressure provided by others, whether a single therapist or a group, ordinarily invisible aspects a person's self may be so surcharged with emotional energy that he is forced to confront them, and this insight may change them. If insight alone is not sufficient, a variety of techniques are available, ranging from operant-conditioning to guided imagery techniques, which can deliberately change specific structures.
Western-style psychotherapy is limited because it is likely to be used not on structures that are basic to the samsaric condition, but only on structures that produce experiences and behaviors that are not acceptable in the particular consensus reality. Thus many psychotherapists are not growth agents in a general sense, but rather work to readjust a deviant person to the consensus reality of his culture. This is not a conscious manipulation on the part of these psychotherapists, but simply a reflection of the power and implicitness of their own enculturation processes. Psychotherapy can be a subversive tool in some practitioners' hands, for some of the assumptions of the consensus reality can be questioned in it, and the patient can grow beyond his culture in some ways. All too often, however, the implicit assumptions are not even questioned.
In stating that most patients do not learn to go beyond consensus reality, I do not want to imply that they should learn to behave in a way that is clearly at odds with consensus reality. To behave in "crazy" ways is no sure sign of escape from samsara. Knowing how to use effectively the consensus reality in which one lives in essential for survival. In terms of cultural, personal, and scientific goals of transcending samsaric limitations of the ordinary state, however, we should be aware of the limits of conventional psychotherapy.


I suspect, as Naranjo has suggested, that the synthesis of the psychotherapy techniques of the West and the spiritual disciplines of the East will form one of the most powerful tools for understanding ourselves that has ever existed. The various kinds mindfulness and nonattachment techniques are the ultimate tools because of their generality, but there may be some psychological structures in the personality that have so much energy, are so implicit, or are so heavily defended that they must be dealt with using specific psychotherapeutic techniques to dismantle them.

How Far Can We Go?

If we assume, for the purpose of this discussion, the at least partial) validity of the radical view of the mind, then what are the limits to human consciousness and awareness? Figure 20-2 presents some speculation along this line.
Consider reality as divided into two realms: MEST, the physical world, of which we know many of the basic laws and are discovering more, and the realm of awareness, whose basic laws are essentially unknown to us at this time. The ordinary d-SoC, then, is the gestalt product of awareness and structure, determined and limited by whatever laws inherently govern each realm, and yet is also an emergent synthesis not fully predictable from the laws of either realm.
In some ways the composite system is even more limited, for both the MEST structure and awareness have been further restricted in the enculturation process. Thus the ordinary d-SoC is capable of considerable expansion: we can change existing structures and build new ones, and we can cultivate the ability to control awareness more freely within these structures and to pay attention to things other than what the culture has defined as important.
Judging from experiential reports, some d-ASCs seem to be much less mechanical, much less controlled by structures and allowing more free range of awareness.

This is represented in Figure 20-2 by the oval just to the left of the ordinary d-SoC penetrating more into the realm of awareness and less into the realm of MEST. Similarly, experiential reports from some d-ASCs—those caused by sedatives, for example—suggest that there is less awareness and far more mechanicalness, that consciousness is far more restricted by structure than ordinarily. Thus another oval, further to the left, shown as more into the MEST realm and less into the awareness realm. The extreme case of this, of course, is mechanical intelligence, the computer, which (as far as we know) has no awareness at all but processes information in a totally mechanical way, a way totally controlled by the laws of the MEST realm. Present computers are also partially limited by cultural structuring; it only occurs to us to program them to do certain "sensible" things, giving them a range that is probably less than their total capability.
Up to this point the discussion is still compatible with the orthodox view of the mind, which sees awareness as a function of the brain. The circle to the far right in Figure 20-2, however, is compatible only with the radical view that awareness can operate partially or totally independently of the brain structure. In some mystical experiences, and in states called out-of-they-body experiences, people report existing at space/time locations different from that of their physical bodies, or being outside of space/time altogether. I believe that parapsychological data require us to consider this kind of statement as more than interesting experiential data, as possibly being valid rather than simply being nonsense. The reader interested in the implications of parapsychology for the study of consciousness should consult other writings of mine {128, 129, 131}. Let me note here that to the extent that this may be true, awareness may potentially become partially or wholly free of the patterning influence of MEST structure.
An awareness of how structures and systems of structures tend automatically to grab attention/awareness and other psychological energies makes it easy to form a picture of structure as bad and to see d-SoCs that are less involved with structure as automatically better or higher. This is a mistake. Structures perform valuable functions as well as confining ones. A d-SoC is not just a way of limiting awareness; it is also a way of focusing attention/awareness and other psychological energies to make effective tools, to enable us to cope in particular ways.
I have observed people in d-ASCs where they seem less caught in structures, more inclined toward the unstructured awareness dimension of mind. My impression is that it was both a gain and a loss: new insights were gained, but there was often an inability to hold to anything and change it in a desired direction. Certainly there are times when not attempting to change anything, just observing, is the best course, but the ability to move between activity and passivity as appropriate is optimal. The structures of d-SoCs aid us by restricting awareness and facilitating focusing. Perhaps as meditative and similar exercises teach us to control attention/awareness more precisely, we may have less need for structures.
As a scientist, I have tried to keep the speculation in these last three chapters compatible with the scientific worldview and the scientific method as I know them. I have often drawn on data not generally accepted in orthodox scientific circles, but they are data that I would be willing to argue are good enough to deserve closer examination. Because I have set myself that restriction in writing this book, I now end speculation on how far human awareness might be able to go, for to continue would take me further from my scientific data base than I am comfortable in going at this time.
Let me conclude with what may seem a curious observation: Western psychology has collected an immense amount of data supporting the concept in the first place. We have studied some aspects of samsara in far more detail than Eastern traditions that originated the concept of samsara. Yet almost no psychologists apply this idea to themselves! They apply all this knowledge of human compulsiveness and mechanicalness to other people, who are labeled "abnormal" or "neurotic," and assume that their own states of consciousness basically logical and clear. Western psychology now has a challenge to recognize this detailed evidence that our "normal" state is a state of samsara and to apply the immense power of science and our other spiritual traditions, East and West, to the search for a way out.

Tao in Eb


http://www.bso.org/

venerdì 20 giugno 2014

il Te del Tao: LXXVIII - PORTARE IL FARDELLO DELLA SINCERITÀ


LXXVIII - PORTARE IL FARDELLO DELLA SINCERITÀ

Nulla al mondo è più molle e più debole dell'acqua
eppur nell'abradere ciò che è duro e forte
nessuno riesce a superarla,
nell'uso nulla può cambiarla.
La debolezza vince la forza,
la mollezza vince la durezza:
al mondo non v'è nessuno che non lo sappia,
ma nessuno v'è che sia capace di attuarlo.
Per questo il santo dice:
chi prende su di sé le sozzure del regno
è signore dell'altare della terra e dei grani,
chi prende su di sé i mali del regno
è sovrano del mondo.
Un detto esatto che appare contraddittorio.
Hougaard Malan

cent'anni di Tao


Molti anni dopo, di fronte al plotone di esecuzione, il colonnello Aureliano Buendìa si sarebbe ricordato di quel remoto pomeriggio in cui suo padre lo aveva condotto a conoscere il ghiaccio. Macondo era allora un villaggio di venti case di argilla e di canna selvatica costruito sulla riva di un fiume dalle acque diafane che rovinavano per un letto di pietre levigate, bianche ed enormi come uova preistoriche. Il mondo era così recente, che molte cose erano prive di nome, e per citarle bisognava indicarle col dito. Tutti gli anni, verso il mese di marzo, una famiglia di zingari cenciosi piantava la tenda vicino al villaggio, e con grande frastuono di zufoli e tamburi faceva conoscere le nuove invenzioni. Prima portarono la calamita. Uno zingaro corpulento, con barba arruffata e mani di passero, che si presentò col nome di Melquìades, diede una truculenta manifestazione pubblica di quella che egli stesso chiamava l'ottava meraviglia dei savi alchimisti della Macedonia. Andò di casa in casa trascinando due lingotti metallici, e tutti sbigottirono vedendo che i paioli, le padelle, le molle del focolare e i treppiedi cadevano dal loro posto, e i legni scricchiolavano per la disperazione dei chiodi e delle viti che cercavano di schiavarsi, e perfino gli oggetti perduti da molto tempo ricomparivano dove pur erano stati lungamente cercati, e si trascinavano in turbolenta sbrancata dietro ai ferri magici di Melquìades. "Le cose hanno vita propria," proclamava lo zingaro con aspro accento, "si tratta soltanto di risvegliargli l'anima." José Arcadio Buendìa, la cui smisurata immaginazione andava sempre più lontano dell'ingegno della natura, e ancora più in là del miracolo e della magia, pensò che era possibile servirsi di quella invenzione inutile per sviscerare l'oro della terra. Melquìades, che era un uomo onesto, lo prevenne: "Per quello non serve." Ma a quel tempo José Arcadio Buendìa non credeva nell'onestà degli zingari, e così barattò il suo mulo e una partita di capri coi due lingotti calamitati.
...
Aureliano non era mai stato così lucido in nessun atto della sua vita come quando dimenticò i suoi morti e il dolore dei suoi morti, e tornò a sbarrare le porte e le finestre con le crociere di Fernanda per non lasciarsi turbare da alcuna tentazione del mondo, perché allora sapeva che nelle pergamene di Melquíades era scritto il suo destino. Le trovò intatte, tra le piante preistoriche e le pozze fumanti e gli insetti luminosi che avevano bandito dalla stanza ogni vestigio del passaggio degli uomini sulla terra, e non ebbe la serenità di portarle alla luce, ma in quel luogo stesso, in piedi, senza la minima difficoltà, come se fossero state scritte in spagnolo sotto lo splendore accecante del mezzogiorno, come a decifrarle a voce alta. Era la storia della famiglia, scritta da Melquiades perfino nei suoi particolari più triviali, con cent'anni di anticipo. L'aveva redatta in sanscrito, che era la sua lingua materna, e aveva cifrato i versi pari con la chiave privata dell'imperatore Augusto, e quelli dispari con chiavi militari lacedemoni. La protezione finale, che Aureliano cominciava a intravedere quando si era lasciato confondere dall'amore di Amaranta Ursula, si basava sul fatto che Melquíades non aveva ordinato i fatti nel tempo convenzionale degli uomini, ma che aveva concentrato un secolo di episodi quotidiani, di modo che tutti coesistessero in un istante. Affascinato dalla scoperta, Aureliano lesse ad alta voce, senza salti, le encicliche cantate che lo stesso Melquíades aveva fatto ascoltare ad Arcadio, e che erano in realtà le predizioni della sua esecuzione, e trovò annunziata la nascita della donna più bella del mondo che stava salendo al cielo in corpo e anima, e conobbe l'origine di due gemelli postumi che rinunciavano a decifrare le pergamene, non soltanto per incapacità e incostanza, ma perché i loro tentativi erano prematuri. A questo punto, impaziente di conoscere la propria origine, Aureliano passò oltre. Allora cominciò il vento, tiepido, incipiente, pieno di voci del passato, di mormorii di gerani antichi, di sospiri di delusioni anteriori alle nostalgie più tenaci. Non se ne accorse perché in quel momento stava scoprendo i primi indizi del suo essere, in un nonno concupiscente che si lasciava trascinare dalla frivolità attraverso un altipiano allucinato, in cerca di una donna bella che non lo avrebbe fatto felice. Aureliano lo riconobbe, incalzò i sentieri occulti della sua discendenza, e trovò l'istante del suo stesso concepimento tra gli scorpioni e le farfalle gialle di un bagno crepuscolare, dove un avventizio saziava la sua lussuria con una donna che gli si dava per ribellione. Era cosí assorto, che non sentì nemmeno il secondo assalto del vento, la cui potenza ciclonica strappò dai cardini le porte e le finestre, svelse il tetto dell'ala orientale e sradicò le fondamenta. Soltanto allora scoprì che Amaranta Ursula non era sua sorella, ma sua zia, e che Francis Drake aveva assaltato Riohacha soltanto perché loro potessero cercarsi per i labirinti più intricati del sangue, fino a generare l'animale mitologico che avrebbe posto termine alla stirpe. Macondo era già un pauroso vortice di polvere e macerie, centrifugato dalla collera dell'uragano biblico, quando Aureliano saltò undici pagine per non perder tempo con fatti fin troppo noti, e cominciò a decifrare l'istante che stava vivendo, e lo decifrava a mano a mano che lo viveva, profetizzando sé stesso nell'atto di decifrare l'ultima pagina delle pergamene, come se si stesse vedendo in uno specchio parlante. Allora saltò oltre per precorrere le predizioni e appurare la data e le circostanze della sua morte. Tuttavia, prima di arrivare al verso finale, aveva già compreso che non sarebbe mai più uscito da quella stanza, perché era previsto che "la città degli specchi" (o degli specchietti) sarebbe stata spianata dal vento e bandita dalla memoria degli uomini nell'istante in cui Aureliano Babilonia avesse terminato di decifrare le pergamene, e che tutto quello che vi era scritto era irripetibile da sempre e per sempre, perché le stirpi condannate a cent'anni di solitudine non avevano una seconda opportunità sulla terra.


The Nobel Prize in Literature 1982 was awarded to Gabriel García Márquez "for his novels and short stories, in which the fantastic and the realistic are combined in a richly composed world of imagination, reflecting a continent's life and conflicts".

giovedì 19 giugno 2014

Successo (6 di Bastoni)


Questa figura è chiaramente 'in cima al mondo' in questo momento, e il mondo intero sta celebrando il suo successo con una parata! Grazie alla tua disponibilità ad accettare le sfide più recenti della vita, adesso sei - o lo sarai molto presto - in grado di goderti un meraviglioso giro in groppa alla tigre del successo. Dai il benvenuto a quest'opportunità, godila e condividi con gli altri la tua gioia - ma ricorda che tutte le fantasmagoriche parate hanno un inizio e una fine. Se lo tieni a mente, e spremi ogni goccia del nettare di felicità che stai sperimentando in questo momento, sarai in grado di accogliere il futuro, quando verrà, senza rimpianti. Ma non farti tentare dalla voglia di aggrapparti a questo momento di abbondanza, né tentare di avvolgerlo nella plastica per farlo durare per sempre... La più grande saggezza da tenere in mente rispetto a tutti i fenomeni che accompagnano la parata della vita - che siano valli o vette - è che “anche questo passerà”. Certo, celebra pure, e continua a cavalcare la tigre.

Osserva le onde dell'oceano. Più si elevano verso l'alto, più profondo è il riflusso che segue. Per un istante sei l'onda, l'attimo dopo sei la scia vuota che segue. Godi entrambe le cose, non assuefarti a nessuna delle due. Non dire: “Vorrei essere sempre sulla vetta”. Non è possibile. Cerca di capire questo fatto: non è possibile. Non è mai accaduto e non accadrà mai. È semplicemente impossibile - non è nella natura delle cose. Allora che fare? Goditi la vetta finché dura e poi, quando viene, goditi la valle. Che male c'è nella valle? Cosa c'è di male nell'essere giù? È un rilassamento. Una vetta è eccitazione, e nessuno può vivere in uno stato di continua eccitazione.

lungo le strade del Tao

mercoledì 18 giugno 2014

difesa del Tao - II

Piero della Francesca, Madonna col Bambino e quattro angeli, dettaglio, 1475-1482, Clark Art Institute
Defenses of Faith

But to say that consciousness may make impossible some desired sequence of events is only to invoke familiar experience – a common substitute for explanation in the behavioural sciences. Credibility may thereby be established, but mystery remains.
The road to explanation lies first through abduction and thence to mapping the phenomena onto tautology. I have argued elsewhere that individual mind and phylogenetic evolution are a useful abductive pair – are mutually cases under similar tautological rules.
If you want to explain a psychological phenomenon, go look at biological evolution; and if you want to explain some phenomenon in evolution, try to find formal psychological analogies, and take a look at your own experience of what it is to have – or be – a mind. Epistemology, the pattern which connects, is, after all, one, not many.
I therefore shall analyze the flaw in the Lamarckian hypothesis and compare it with the problem of the Ancient Mariner. It is so that ―inheritance of acquired characteristics‖ would induce into biological evolution the same sort of confusion and blockage that sending the Ancient Mariner to the South Seas to find sea snakes would introduce into the process of his escape prom guilt? If the comparison be valid, it will surely throw light on both the evolutionary and the human mental process.
I am interested, at this moment, only in the formal objections to the Lamarckian hypothesis. It is no doubt correct to say that (a) there is no experimental evidence for such inheritance and (b) no connection can be imagined by which news of an acquired characteristic (say a strengthened right biceps brought about by exercise) could be transmitted to the ova or spermatozoa of the individual organism. But these otherwise very important considerations are not relevant to the problem of the Ancient Mariner and his self-consciousness In these respects there is no analogy between the Ancient Mariner and the hypothetical Lamarckian organism. There is plenty of evidence for the assertion that conscious purpose may distort spontaneity and, alas, plenty of pathways of internal communication by which such messages and injunctions may travel. I ask instead, what would the whole of biology look like if the inheritance of acquired characteristics were general? What would be the effect on biological evolution of such a hypothetical process?
Darwin was driven to the Lamarckian fallacy by time. He believed that the age of the earth was insufficient to provide time for the vast sweep of evolutionary process and, in order to speed up his model of evolution, he introduced into that model the Lamarckian hypothesis. To rely only on random genetic change combined with natural selection seemed insufficient, and Lamarckian inheritance would provide a shortcut, speeding things up by introducing something like purpose into the system. And, notably, our hypothetical procedure for the cure of the Ancient Mariner‘s guilt was likewise an introduction of purpose into that system. Should the Ancient Mariner go purposeless on his voyage, or should he deliberately search for sea snakes with the purpose of blessing them and so escaping from his guilt? Purpose will save time. If he knows what he is looking for, he will waste no time in scanning the arctic seas.
What then is a shortcut? What is wrong with the proposed shortcuts in evolution and in the resolution of guilt? What is wrong, in principle, with shortcuts?
In a large variety of cases – perhaps in all cases in which the shortcut generates trouble – the root of the matter is an error in logical typing. Somewhere in the sequence of actions and ideas, we can expect to find a class treated as though it were one of its members; or a member treated as though it were identical with the class; a uniqueness treated as a generality or a generality treated as a uniqueness. It is legitimate (and usual) to think of a process or change as an ordered class of states, but a mistake to think of any one of these states as if it were the class of which it is only a member. According to the Lamarckian hypothesis, an individual parent organism is to pass onto its offspring through the digital machinery of genetics some somatic characteristic acquired in response to environmental stress. The hypothesis asserts that ―the acquired characteristic is inherited‖ and there the matter is left as though these words could be meaningful.
It is characteristic of the individual creature that, under environmental conditions of use and disuse, etc., it will change. All right. But this is not the characteristic that is supposedly passed on; not the potentiality for change but the state achieved by the change is what is to be inherited, and that characteristic is not inherent in the parent. According to hypothesis the offspring should differ from the parent in that they will show the supposedly inherited characteristic even when the environmental conditions do not demand it.
But to assert that the man-made hypothesis of the inheritance of acquired characteristics is semantic nonsense in not the same as to assert that if the hypothesis were true, the whole process of evolution would be bogged down. What is crucial is that the individual creature would be inflicting upon its offspring a rigidity from which the parent did not suffer. It is this loss of flexibility that would be lethal to the total process.
So – if there be formal analogy between the case of Lamarckian ―inheritance‖ and the conscious purpose that might block the release of the Ancient Mariner from his guilt, we should look in the latter case for an error in classification that would prevent the desired change – error in which a process is treated as a state. It is precisely the conscious reification of his guilt in the Albatross that makes it impossible for the Ancient Mariner to get rid of his guilt. Guilt is not a thing. The matter must be handed over to more unconscious mental processes whose epistemology is less grotesque. (And if the Mariner is to solve his problem, he must not know he is doing so).
Consciousness is necessarily very limited. That it is so limited is perhaps best demonstrated by an example from a set of experiments on perception that were pioneered by an ophthalmologist, Adelbert Ames, Jr., now, alas, deceased. He showed that in the act of vision you rely on a whole mass of presuppositions, which you cannot inspect or state in words – such abstract rules as those of parallax and perspective. Using them you construct your mental image.
It is epistemologically inaccurate to say that "you see me". What you see is an image of me made by processes of which you are quite unconscious.
It would be nonsense, of course, to say that "you" make these images. You have almost no control over the making of them. (And if you had that sort of control, your trust in the images that perception displays before your inner eye would be much reduced.)
So we all make – my mental processes make for me – this beautiful quilt. Patches of green and brown, black and white as I walk through the woods. But I cannot by introspection investigate that creative process. I know which way I aim my eyes and I am conscious of the product of perception, but I know nothing of the middle process by which the images are formed.
That middle process is governed by presuppositions. What Adelbert Ames discovered was a method of investigating those presuppositions, and an account of his experiments is a good way of arriving at a recognition of the importance of these presuppositions of which we are normally unaware.
If I am travelling in a moving train, the cows on the embankment seem to get left behind while the distant mountains seem to travel with me. On the basis of this difference in appearances, an image is created in which the mountains are depicted as farther from me than the cows. The underlying premise is that that which gets left behind is closer to me than that which seems to go along with me or which is more slowly left behind.
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The Ames experiments can be used to demonstrate two important notions, first that the images we experience are not "out there," and second that we are, perhaps necessarily, unaware of what is going on in our own minds. We think we see, but actually we create images, all unconsciously. What then is one to make of Descartes‘ famous conclusion, cogito, ergo sum?
The cogito is ambiguous. At what level are we to interpret it? What does it mean? What is it to think? What is it to be? Does it mean "I think that I think, and therefore I think I am"? Can I in fact know that I think? And are we, in reaching such a conclusion, relying on presuppositions of which we are unaware?
There is a discrepancy of logical type between "think" and "be." Descartes is trying to jump from the frying pan of thought, ideas, images, opinions, arguments, etc., into the fire of existence and action. But that jump is itself unmapped. Between two such contrasting universes there can be no ergo – no totally self-evident link. There is no looking before the leap from cogito to sum.
Parallel to the cogito is another deep epistemological generalization: I see, therefore it is. Seeing is believing. We might roughly Latinize this to include the other senses, even though sight carries the greatest conviction for most people, as percipio, ergo est.
The two halves of Descartes'cogito refer to a single subject, a first person singular, but in the percipio there are two subjects: I and it. These two subjects are separated by the circumstances of imagery. The "it" which I perceive is ambiguous: is it my image which I make? Or is it some object outside of myself – the Ding an sich of which I make an image? Or perhaps there is no "it".
In English the separation is forced upon us by the structure of our language, but the Latin makes no explicit cleavage between the event of thinking and the thinker. It does not separate the pronoun from the verb. That separation could come later, much later, and raises another set of epistemological problems.
The first miracle is the event of thinking, which can (also later) be named. The problems multiply as we explore further. Warren McCulloch long ago pointed out that every message is both command and report. In the simplest case, a sequence of three neurons – A, B, and C – the firing of B is a report that "A recently fired" and a command: "C must quickly fire". In one aspect the neural impulse refers to the past, in the other aspect it determines a future. B‘s report is, in the nature of the case, never totally reliable, for the firing of A can never be the only possible cause of B‘s later firing: Neurons sometimes fire "spontaneously". In principle, no causal network is to be read backwards. Similarly, C may fail to obey B‘s injunction.
There are gaps in this process, which make the sequential firing of neurons unsure; and there are multiple such gaps on the way to propositions like the cogito that are at first glance "self-evident". In the aggregates of propositions that are called "faiths," or religious creeds, it is ultimately not the propositions that assert indubitable and self-evident truth but the links between them. It is these links that we dare not doubt – and indeed doubt is comfortingly excluded by the logical or quasi-logical nature of the links. We are defended from doubt by an unawareness of the gaps.
But the jump is always there. If I look my through my corporeal eyes and see an image of the rising sun, the propositions "I look" and "I see" have a sort of validity different from that of any conclusion about the world outside my skin. "I see a sun rising" is a proposition that indeed, as Descartes insists, cannot be doubted, but the extrapolation from this to the outside world – "There is a sun" – is always unsure and must be supported by faith. Another problem is that all such images are retrospective. The assertion of the image, qua description of the external world, is always in a past tense. Our senses can only tell us at best what was so a moment ago. We do in fact read the causal sequence backwards. But this fundamentally unreliable information is delivered to the perceiving self in the most convincing and indubitable form as an image. It is this faith – a faith in our own mental process – that must always be defended!
It is commonly thought that faith is necessary for religion – that the supernatural aspects of mythology must not be questioned – so the gap between the observer and the supernatural is covered by faith. But when we recognize the gap between cogito and sum, and the similar gap between percipio and est, "faith" comes to have quite a different meaning. Gaps such as these are a necessity of our being, to be covered by "faith" in a very intimate and deep sense of that word.
Then what is ordinarily called “religion,” the net of ritual, mythology, and mystification, begins to show itself as a sort of cocoon woven to protect that more intimate – and utterly necessary – faith.
By some admirable and mysterious skill, some miracle of neural circuitry, we form images of that which we see. The forming of such images is in fact what we call "seeing." But to base complete belief upon the image is an act of faith. This faith is, in a healthy mind, involuntary and unconscious. You cannot doubt the validity of your images when these are accompanied by that extra tag of information which says that the material for the given image was collected by a sense organ.
How lucky we are, how good is God – that we cannot perceive the process of our creation of our own images! These miraculous mental processes are simply not accessible to tour conscious inspection.
When you are dizzy and the floor seems to heave up towards you, only by the exercise of trained determination can you act upon your "knowledge" that, of course, the floor is remaining stationary, as it should. Indeed, that greater faith accompanied by will, whereby we resist the response to dizziness, is I think always supported by a conscious scepticism regarding the visual-kinesthetic imagery. We can say to ourselves, "I know that this swirling floor and walls is a misleading product of my processes of image formation." But even so, there is no consciousness of the processes by which the swirling images were made – only a consciousness that they are indeed artefact. We can know about the processes of perception, but we cannot be directly aware of them. [Even at this level, however, consciousness opens the door to tinkering.]
If we had continual awareness of our image-making processes, our images would cease to be credible. It is indeed a merciful dispensation that we know not the processes of our own creativity – which sometimes are the processes of self-deceit.
To be unconscious of these processes is the first line of our defense against loss of faith. A little faith in perception is vitally necessary, and by packing our data into the form of images, we convince ourselves of the validity of our belief. Seeing is believing. But faith is in believing that seeing is believing. As Blake said of the "corporeal", which we believe we know, "It is in Fallacy, and its Existence an imposture."
Still, all of this is familiar. It is platitude to assert that every perception and every link between perception and motion is made possible by faith in presuppositions. Hamlet reminds his mother, "Sense sure you have, else you could have no motion."
The links between sense and motion are indispensable to living, but the links depend always upon presuppositions that are commonly either absolutely inaccessible to consciousness, or momentarily left unexamined in the immediacy of action. There is no time for more than a little consciousness.
The matter becomes more subtle, more coercive, and somewhat more mysterious when we ask formally analogous questions about larger systems, such as groups of organisms, and particularly about families, communities, and tribes, constellations of organisms who (partially at least) share what anthropologists call "culture."
One of the meanings of that overworked word is the local epistemology, the aggregate of presuppositions that underlie all communication and interaction between persons, even in dyads, groups with only two members.
[It is at this point that our discussion of perception links up with the discussion of inheritance, for in each case the fact that many presuppositions are inaccessible to examination or alteration results in a certain conservatism, since that which is outside of awareness is also unquestioned. It may be useful, then, to examine the conservatism characteristic of all such systems of presuppositions and the mechanisms by which such systems are maintained and kept stable.]
Young men-in-a-hurry may be impatient of such conservatism, and psychiatrists may diagnose conservatism as pathological rigidity, etc., etc. But I am not concerned at the moment to reach judgements of value, only to understand the processes and their necessity.
Of all interactional conservative devices, undoubtedly the most fundamental – most ancient and profound, and most instructive as providing a diagram of what I am talking about – is sex.
We forget so easily – and by forgetting we preserve our presuppositions unexamined – that the prime function of the sexual component in reproduction (literally the production of the similar) is the maintenance of similarity among the members of the species. And here similarity is the necessary condition for viability of communication and interaction.
The mechanism and its goal become identical: that compatibility which is necessary for interaction is maintained by creating a test-tube trial of similarity. If the gametes are not sufficiently similar, a zygote formed from their meeting cannot survive. At the cellular level every living organism is the embodiment of a tested sharing of biological presuppositions.
Tests against the outside world will come later – many of them. At the moment of fertilization – fusion of gametes – each gamete is a validating template for the other. What is surely tested is the chromosomal constitution of each, but no doubt the similarity of the whole cellular structure is also verified. And not that this first test is not the meaning of the chromosomal message, the process of epigenesist and the later outcome in the developed individual or phenotype that will be tested by the need to survive in a given environment. The test is just a proofreader‘s trick, comparing the format of one text with that of the other, but ignoring the nature and meaning of the message material which is being tested. Other tests will come later and will not be exclusively conservative.
Samuel Butler famously asserted that "the hen is an egg‘s way of making another egg." We might amplify that to say that the hen is the proof (the test) of the excellence of the egg; and that the moment of fusion between two gametes is the first proof or test of their mutual excellence. Note that excellence is in some sense always mutual; the conservatism whose mechanics I am discussing is always interactive.
From these very elementary generalities, it is possible to proceed in several directions, which can only be suggested here. There is the undoubted truth that the relations between presuppositions (in some widest sense of that word) are never simply dyadic. We must go on to consider a greater complexity. It is not a matter of simple dyadic comparison as my reference to sexual fusion might seem to suggest. We can begin by considering a pair of gametal characteristics that meet in fertilization. But always each must exist in the context of many characteristics, and the comparison will not be a simple yes-or-no test of similarity but a complex fitting or wrestling together (in real time) of related but never totally similar networks of propositions, which must combine in a coherent set of injunctions for the epigenesist and growth of the organism. There is room for – indeed there is benefit from – a little variation, but only a limited amount.
That‘s one component of the picture – the increasing complexity as we go on from dyadic to more complex relations between the items of presupposition. (We could use an alternative term that is virtually synonymous and speak of "preconceptions" – in a literal, prezygotic sense!)
The second pathway of increasing complexity we are invited to follow by the infinitely complex and systemic biosphere is a spin-off from the way systems are nested within systems, the fact of hierarchical organizations. For instance, as natural historians on the family we face a more than dyadic constellation of persons. To the nondyadic tangle of related presuppositions, we must add the nondyadic tangle of persons in which the family is the mechanism of cultural transmission. In looking at human beings we deal not simply with genetics, the digital names for settings of the bias of the system, but with another order of change – the facts of learning and teaching. (And do not forget that in what is called "cultural transmission," parents learn from and are as much changed as their children!)
The complexity of the phenomena is beginning to run away with us and whenever that happens, the correct and orthodox procedure is reductionism – to stand off from the data and consider what sort of simplified (always oversimplified) mapping will do least damage tot eh elegant interconnections of the observed world.
We must take care, however, to preserve in our theories at least the biological nature (cybernetic, hierarchic, holistic, nonlineal, systemic nature – call it what you will) of the world and our relations to it. Let us not pretend that mental phenomena can be mapped onto the characteristics of billiard balls.

difesa del Tao - I