componenti del Tao: consapevolezza ed energia

© Edgar Mueller

Introdotte nell'analisi sistemica degli stati di coscienza le tre componenti di sistema: consapevolezza - energia e strutture, Charles T. Tart ne descrive le caratteristiche e le interazioni:

Awareness and Energy

We begin with a concept of some kind of basic awareness — an ability to know or sense or cognize or recognize that something is happening. This is a basic theoretical and experiential given. We do not know scientifically what its ultimate nature is, but it is where we start from. I call this concept attention/awareness, to relate it to another basic given, which is that we have some ability to direct this awareness from one thing to another.

This basic attention/awareness is something we can both conceptualize and (to some extent) experience as distinct from the particular content of awareness at any time. I am aware of a plant beside me at this moment of writing and if I turn my head I am aware of a chair. The function of basic awareness remains in spite of various changes in its content.

A second basic theoretical and experiential given is the existence, at times, of an awareness of being aware, self-awareness. The degree of self-awareness varies from moment to moment. At one extreme, I can be very aware that at this moment I am aware that I am looking at the plant beside me. At the other extreme, I may be totally involved in looking at the plant, but not be aware of being aware of it. There is an experiential continuum at one end of which attention/awareness and the particular content of awareness are essentially merged, and at the other end of which awareness of being aware exists in addition to the particular content of the awareness. In between are mixtures: at this moment of writing I am groping for clarity of the concept I want to express and trying out various phrases to see if they adequately express it. In low-intensity flashes, I have some awareness of what I am doing, but most of the time I am absorbed in this particular thought process. The lower end of the self-awareness continuum, relatively total absorption, is probably where we spend most of our lives, even though we like to credit ourselves with high self-awareness.

The relative rarity of self-awareness is a major contributor to neurotic qualities of behavior and to the classification of ordinary consciousness as illusion or waking dreaming by many spiritual systems... The higher end of the continuum of self-awareness comes to us even more rarely, although it may be sought deliberately in certain kinds of meditative practices, such as the Buddhist vipassana meditation...

The ultimate degree of self-awareness, of separation of attention/awareness from content, that is possible in any final sense varies with one's theoretical position about the ultimate nature of the mind. If one adopts the conventional view that mental activity is a product of brain functioning, thus totally controlled by the electrical-structural activity of brain functioning, there is a definite limit to how far awareness can back off form particular content, since that awareness is a product of the structure and content of the individual brain. This is a psychological manifestation of the physical principle of relativity... Although the feeling of being aware can have an objective quality, this conventional position holds that the objectivity is only relative, for the very function of awareness itself stems from and is shaped by the brain activity it is attempting to be aware of.

A more radical view, common to the spiritual psychologies, is that basic awareness is not just a property of the brain, but is (at least partially) something from outside the workings of the brain. Insofar as this is true, it is conceivable that most or all content associated with brain processes could potentially be stood back from so that the degree of separation between content and attention/awareness, the degree of self-awareness, is potentially much higher than in the conservative view.

Whichever ultimate view one takes, the psychologically important concept for studying consciousness is that the degree of experienced separation of attention/awareness from content varies considerably from moment to moment.

Attention/awareness can be volitionally directed to some extent. If I ask you to become aware of the sensations in your left knee now, you can do so. but few would claim anything like total ability to direct attention. If you are being burned by a flame, it is generally impossible to direct your attention/awareness to something else and not notice the pain at all, although this can be done by a few people in the ordinary d-SoC and by many more people in certain states of consciousness. Like the degree of separation of attention/awareness from content, the degree to which we can volitionally direct our attention/awareness also varies. Sometimes we can easily direct our thoughts according to a predetermined plan; at other times our minds wander with no regard at all for our plans.

Stimuli and structures attract or capture attention/awareness. When you are walking down the street, the sound and sight of an accident and a crowd suddenly gathering attract your attention to the incident. This attractive pull of stimuli and activated structures may outweigh volitional attempts to deploy attention/awareness elsewhere. For example, you worry over and over about a particular problem and are told that you are wasting energy by going around in circles and should direct your attention elsewhere. but, in spite of your desire to do so, you may find it almost impossible.

The ease with which particular kinds of structures and contents capture attention/awareness varies with the state of consciousness and the personality structure of the individual. For example, things that are highly valued or are highly threatening capture attention much more easily than things that bore us. Indeed, we can partially define personality as those structures that habitually capture a person's attention/awareness. In some states of consciousness, attention/awareness is more forcibly captivated by stimuli than in others.

Attention/awareness constitutes the major energy of the mind, as we usually experience it. Energy is here used in its most abstract sense — the ability to do work, to make something happen. Attention/awareness is energy (1) in the sense that structures having no effect on consciousness at a given time can be activated if attended to; (2) in the sense that structures may draw attention/awareness energy automatically, habitually, as a function of personality structure, thus keeping a kind of low-level, automated attention in them all the time (these are our long-term desires, concerns, phobias, blindnesses); and (3) in the sense that attention/awareness energy may inhibit particular structures from functioning. The selective redistribution of attention/awareness energy to desired ends is a key aspect of innumerable systems that have been developed to control the mind. The concept of psychological energy is usually looked upon with disfavor by psychologists because it is difficult to define clearly. Yet various kinds of psychological energies are direct experiential realities. I am, for example, full of energy for writing at this moment. When interrupted a minute ago, I resented having to divert this energy from writing to dealing with a different issue. Last night I was tired; I felt little energy available to do what I wished to do. Those who prefer to give priority to observations about the body and nervous system in their thinking would tell me that various chemicals in my bloodstream were responsible for these varied feelings. But "chemicals in my bloodstream" is a very intellectual, abstract concept to me, while the feelings of energy and of tiredness are direct experiences for me and most other people. So we must consider psychological energy in order to keep our theorizing close to experience.

I cannot deal in any detail with psychological energy at this stage of development of the systems approach, for we know little about it. Clearly, changing the focus of attention (as in trying to sense what is happening in your left knee) has effects: it starts, stops, and alters psychological processes. Also, attention/awareness is not the only form of psychological energy. Emotions, for example, constitute a very important kind of energy, different in quality from simple attention/awareness shifts, but interacting with attention/awareness as an energy. So while this book deals concept of psychological energy is much more complex and is one of the major areas to be developed in the future.

Note that the total amount of attention/awareness energy available to a person varies from time to time, but there may be some fixed upper limit on it for a particular day or other time period. Some days, we simply cannot concentrate well no matter how much we desire it; other days we seem able to focus clearly, to use lots of attention to accomplish things. We talk about exhausting our ability to pay attention, and it may be that the total amount of attention/awareness energy available is fixed for various time periods under ordinary conditions.

Tao psicothesis

Diagramma della psiche secondo S. Freud

Diagramma della psiche secondo R. Assagioli,
detto "uovo di Assagioli"

"Una delle maggiori cecità, delle illusioni più nocive e pericolose che ci impediscono di essere quali potremmo essere, di raggiungere l'alta meta a cui siamo destinati, è di pretendere di essere, per così dire "tutti d'un pezzo", di possedere cioè una personalità ben definita".

Roma, 1926

Signore e Signori, non so quanto ognuno di voi sappia sulla psicoanalisi dalle sue letture o per sentito dire. Sono comunque obbligato dalla formulazione letterale del programma annunciato "Introduzione elementare alla psicoanalisi" - a trattarvi come se non ne sapeste nulla e aveste bisogno di una prima informazione.

Posso, tuttavia, presupporre quanto meno che voi sappiate che la psicoanalisi è un procedimento per il trattamento medico delle malattie nervose, e quindi darvi subito un esempio di come in questo campo parecchie cose procedano in modo diverso, spesso addirittura opposto, che altrove nella medicina. Altrove, quando sottoponiamo un malato a una tecnica medica a lui nuova, siamo soliti svalutargliene gli inconvenienti e fargli rassicuranti promesse circa i risultati del trattamento.

Ritengo che ne abbiamo il diritto, perché con questa condotta aumentiamo le probabilità di successo. Quando invece prendiamo un nevrotico in trattamento psicoanalitico, ci comportiamo diversamente. Gli prospettiamo le difficoltà del metodo, la sua lunga durata, gli sforzi e i sacrifici che esso costa e, per quanto concerne il risultato, diciamo di non poterglielo promettere con certezza, che esso dipende dal suo comportamento, dalla sua comprensione, dalla sua docilità, dalla sua perseveranza. Per comportarci in modo apparentemente così assurdo, abbiamo naturalmente i nostri buoni motivi, di cui forse in seguito potrete rendervi conto.

Vienna, primavera 1917

Sigmund Freud ha fatto un grande lavoro creando la psicoanalisi, ma è solo la metà.
L'altra metà è la psicosintesi creata da Assagioli – ma anche questa è solo metà.

Non che Assagioli sia giusto e Freud sia sbagliato; entrambi sono sbagliati presi separatamente.
Sono nel giusto solo quando sono posti insieme.

Psicothesis* è l'intero. 
* Thesis, latino, dal greco ϑέσις (posizione, cosa che viene posta), derivazione di τίϑημι, porre, collocare.

il Creatore (Re di Bastoni)

Il Maestro Zen di questa carta ha imbrigliato l'energia del fuoco ed è in grado di usarla per creare, anziché distruggere. Egli ci invita a riconoscere e a partecipare con lui alla comprensione che appartiene a coloro che hanno padroneggiato i fuochi della passione, senza reprimerli, o permettere loro di diventare distruttivi e perdere di equilibrio. È così integrato che non esiste più alcuna differenza tra chi è all'interno e chi è nel mondo esterno. Offre questo dono di comprensione e di integrazione a tutti coloro che arrivano da lui: il dono della luce creativa che scaturisce dal centro del suo essere. Il Re di Fuoco ci informa che qualsiasi cosa intraprendiamo in questo momento, con la comprensione che scaturisce dalla maturità, arricchirà le nostre vite e quelle degli altri. Usa tutte le tue capacità, qualsiasi cosa hai appreso dall'esperienza della tua vita: è tempo per te di esprimerti.

---

Nel mondo esistono due tipi di creatori: uno opera con gli oggetti - un poeta, un pittore opera con gli oggetti, crea qualcosa; l'altro tipo, il mistico, crea se stesso. Non lavora con gli oggetti, opera col soggetto; lavora su di sé, col proprio essere. È il vero creatore, il vero poeta, poiché fa di se stesso un capolavoro. Ognuno di voi porta in sé un capolavoro nascosto, però voi siete d'intralcio. Spostatevi, e il capolavoro verrà alla luce. Ognuno di voi è un capolavoro, perché Dio non fa nascere altro che questo: per molte vite tutti si portano dentro quel capolavoro nascosto, senza sapere chi sono, eppure tentando in superficie di diventare qualcuno. Lascia cadere l'idea di diventare qualcuno: sei già un capolavoro, non ti puoi migliorare. Devi solo arrivare a coglierlo, a conoscerlo, a realizzarlo. Dio stesso ti ha creato, non puoi migliorarti!

è un momento delicato per il Tao

Come se avesse afferrato due libri poggiati su una credenza, le tegole si sfilarono e gli rimasero in mano. Ebbe solo il tempo di bestemmiare poi la gravità lo porto giú, e lo schiantò a terra tra un vaso di cemento e il tavolo.

Steso sul pavimento guardava il cielo a bocca aperta. Le stelle pulsavano nella volta celeste e gli sembrava di essere finito su un pianeta privo di ossigeno, perché continuava a succhiare aria senza riuscirci. Finalmente un colpo di tosse gli liberò la trachea e dalla bocca con uno spruzzo gli uscí tutta l’acqua che s’era bevuto. In cambio ricevette una boccata d’ossigeno. A braccia aperte come un Cristo in croce, la bocca spalancata e la testa poggiata sulle mattonelle ancora roventi, riprese a respirare.

Sono vivo. Poi un’onda di sofferenza gli risalí dai piedi su per le caviglie, gli attraversò i polpacci, le ginocchia, le cosce, gli rattrappí le viscere, gli strizzò il diaframma e gli esplose tra le tempie. Come la mamma premurosa copre il figlioletto dai rigori dell’inverno con una coltre, cosí la sorte bastarda coprí Fabietto Ricotti con un sudario di dolore.

Si guardò la mano destra. Ordinò alle dita di chiudersi e quelle obbedirono.

Almeno non era paralizzato, ma aveva paura a guardare in basso.

Lí, dove il dolore aveva la sua sorgente.

Tirò su la testa.

Guardò.

Svenne.

«C'era una parte poco frequentata delle edicole della stazione, quasi abbandonata, quella dei tascabili.
Tra i libri accatastati, nascosti dietro un vetro, avvolti nella plastica e ricoperti di polvere cercavo le raccolte di racconti. Era un momento tutto mio, un piacere solitario e veloce perché il treno stava partendo.
Studiavo un po' i disegni della copertina, pagavo e infilavo il libro in tasca. Appena mi sedevo al mio posto, gli strappavo la plastica che non lo faceva respirare.
Aprivo una pagina a caso, trovavo l'inizio del racconto e attaccavo a leggere. Altre volte, invece, guardavo l'indice e sceglievo il titolo che mi ispirava di piú.
E mentre il treno mi portava via finivo su pianeti in cui c'è sempre la notte, su scale mobili che non finiscono mai e tra mogli che uccidono i mariti a colpi di cosciotti di agnello congelati.
Quella era vera goduria. E spero che la stessa goduria la possa provare anche tu, caro lettore, leggendo questa raccolta di racconti che ho scritto durante gli ultimi vent'anni. C'è un po' di tutto. Non devi per forza leggerla in treno. Leggila dove ti pare e parti dall'inizio o aprendo a caso».

© Ilyes Laszlo - Fotolia

Tao né soprannaturale né meccanico - II

The beliefs of the counterculture and of the human potential movement may be superstitious and irrational, but their reason for being and indeed the reason for the growth of that whole movement in the 1970 was a good reason. It was to generate that buffer of diversity that will protect the human being against obsolescence. The older beliefs have ceased to provide either explanation or confidence. The integrity of leaders in government, industry, and education who live by the old beliefs has become suspect. The dimly felt obsolescence is central to – and at the root of – the epistemological nightmare of the twentieth century. It should now be possible to find a more stable theoretical stance. We need such a stance to limit the excesses both of the materialists and these who flirt with the supernatural. And further, we need a revised philosophy and epistemology to reduce the intolerance that divides the two camps. “A plague on both your houses!” Mercutio exclaims as he dies.

And I assert that we know enough today to expect that this improved istance will be unitary, and that the conceptual separation between mind and matter will be seen to be a by-product of – a spin-off from – an insufficient holism. When we focus too narrowly upon the parts, we fail to see the necessary characteristics of the whole, and are then tempted to ascribe the phenomena which result from wholeness to some supernatural entity. People who read what I have written too often get from my writing some support for supernatural ideas which they certainly entertained before they read my work. I have never knowingly provided such support, and the false impression which, it seems, I give is a barrier between them and me. I do not know what to do except to make abundantly clear what opinions I hold regarding the supernatural on the one hand and the mechanical on the other. Very simply, let me say that I despise and fear both of these extremes of opinion and that I believe both extremes to be epistemologically naive, epistemologically wrong, and politically dangerous. They are also dangerous to something which we may loosely call mental health. My friends urge me to listen to more stories of the supernatural, to subject myself to various sorts of experience, and to meet more practitioners of the improbable. They say I am being narrow-minded in this connection. Indeed so. After all, I am by bent and training sceptical, even about sense data. I do believe – really I do – that there is some connection between my experience and what is happening out there to affect my sense organs. But I treat that connection not as matter-of-course but as very mysterious and requiring much investigation. Like other people, I normally experience much that does not happen out there. When I aim my eyes at what I think is a tree, I receive an image of something green. But that image is not out there. To believe that is itself a form of superstition, for the image is a creation of my own, shaped and colored by many circumstances, including my preconceptions.

Tao né soprannaturale né meccanico - I

minoranza del Tao

- Sà cosa stavo pensando? Io stavo pensando una cosa molto triste, cioè che io, anche in una società più decente di questa, mi troverò sempre con una minoranza di persone. Ma non nel senso di quei film dove c'è un uomo e una donna che si odiano, si sbranano su un'isola deserta perché il regista non crede nelle persone. Io credo nelle persone, però non credo nella maggioranza delle persone. Mi sà che mi troverò sempre a mio agio e d'accordo con una minoranza...e quindi..."

forme di Tao mentale

Dopo aver definito l'orizzonte epistemologico-fenomenologico del loro discorso Varela, Rosch e Thompson passano a delineare i vari approcci e paradigmi delle scienze della cognizione:

What Is Cognitive Science?

In its widest sense the term cognitive science is used to indicate that the study of mind is in itself a worthy scientific pursuit. At this time cognitive science is not yet established as a mature science. It does not have a clearly agreed upon sense of direction and a large number of researchers constituting a community, as is the case with, say, atomic physics or molecular biology. Rather, it is really more of a loose affiliation of disciplines than a discipline of its own. Interestingly, an important pole is occupied by artificial intelligence - thus the computer model of the mind is a dominant aspect of the entire field. The other affiliated disciplines are generally taken to consist of linguistics, neuroscience, psychology, sometimes anthropology, and the philosophy of mind. Each discipline would give a somewhat different answer to the question of what is mind or cognition, an answer that would reflect its own specific concerns. The future development of cognitive science is therefore far from clear, but what has already been produced has had a distinct impact, and this may well continue to be the case.

From Alexandre Koyre to Thomas Kuhn, modem historians and philosophers have argued that scientific imagination mutates radically from one epoch to another and that the history of science is more like a novelistic saga than a linear progression. In other words, there is a human history of nature, a story that is well worth telling in more than one way. Alongside such a human history of nature there is a corresponding history of ideas about human self-knowledge. Consider, for example, Greek physics and the Socratic method or Montaigne's essays and early French science. This history of selfknowledge in the West remains to be fully explored. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that precursors of what we now call cognitive science have been with us all along, since the human mind is the closest and most familiar example of cognition and knowledge.

In this parallel history of mind and nature, the modem phase of cognitive science may represent a distinct mutation. At this time, science (i.e., the collection of scientists who define what science must be) not only recognizes that the investigation of knowledge itself is legitimate but also conceives of knowledge in a broad, interdisciplinary perspective, well beyond the traditional confines of epistemology and psychology. This mutation, only some thirty years old, was dramatically introduced through the "cognitivist" program (discussed later), much as the Darwinian program inaugurated the scientific study of evolution even though others had been concerned with evolution before.

Furthermore, through this mutation, knowledge has become tangibly and inextricably linked to a technology that transforms the social practices which make that very knowledge possible-artificial intelligence being the most visible example. Technology, among other things, acts as an amplifier. One cannot separate cognitive science and cognitive technology without robbing one or the other of its vital complementary element. Through technology, the scientific exploration of mind provides society at large with an unprecedented mirror of itself, well beyond the circle of the philosopher, the psycholo gist, the therapist, or any individual seeking insight into his own experience.

This mirror reveals that for the first time Western society as a whole is confronted in its everyday life and activities with such issues as: Is mind a manipulation of symbols? Can language be understood by a machine? These concerns directly touch people's lives; they are not merely theoretical. Thus it is hardly surprising that there is a constant interest in the media about cognitive science and its associated technology and that artificial intelligence has deeply penetrated the minds of the young through computer games and science fiction. This popular interest is a sign of a deep transformation: For millenia human beings have had a spontaneous understanding of their own experience - one embedded in and nourished by the larger context of their time and culture. Now, however, this spontaneous folk understanding has become inextricably linked to science and can be transformed by scientific constructions.

Many deplore this event, while others rejoice. What is undeniable is that the event is happening, and at an ever increasing speed and depth. We feel that the creative interpenetration among research scientists, technologists, and the general public holds a potential for the profound transformation of human awareness. We find this possibility fascinating and see it as one of the most interesting adventures open to everyone today. We offer this book as (we hope) a meaningful contribution to that trans formative conversation.

Throughout this book, we will emphasize the diversity of visions within cognitive science. In our eyes, cognitive science is not a monolithic field, though it does have, as does any social activity, poles of domination so that some of its participating voices acquire more force than others at various periods of time. Indeed, this sociological aspect of cognitive science is striking, for the "cognitive revolution" of the past four decades was strongly influenced through specific lines of research and funding in the United States.

Nevertheless, our bias here will be to emphasize diversity. We propose to look at cognitive science as consisting of three successive stages ... to help orient the reader, we will provide a short overview of these stages here. We have drawn them in the form of a "polar" map with three concentric rings:

The three stages correspond to the successive movement from center to periphery; each ring indicates an important shift in the theoretical framework within cognitive science. Moving around the circle, we have placed the major disciplines that constitute the field of cognitive science. Thus we have a conceptual chart in which we can place the names of various researchers whose work is both representative and will appear in the discussion that follows .

Alcuni testi rappresentativi dell'approccio riduzionista-cognitivista-interazionista alla coscienza e al Sé.
Il testo di Minsky è il paradigma all'approccio simbolico della mente e il testo fondamentale per l'Intelligenza Artificiale.
Il testo di Damasio è il classico (ed unico possibile) approccio "dal basso" all'emergenza della coscienza e del Sé effettuabile nell'ambito delle neuroscienze: si dà per scontato (dato che è evidente esperienza comune e condivisa) l'esistenza del Sé e poi si procede a definirne diverse parti e qualità suscettibili di ricerca.
Il testo di Popper e Eccles è un miscuglio tra epistemologia e neuroscienze, in cui si ipotizza che esista "il fantasma nella macchina", ovvero vi siano recessi nascosti nel cervello che nascondono il Sé e non ne permettono la completa spiegazione neuroscientifica.
Il testo di Crick, fondatore della biologia molecolare, assume in termini materialistici che la coscienza (e anche l'ipotesi dell'anima) possa venir spiegata completamente sulla base delle neuroscienze.

We begin … with the center or core of cognitive science, known generally as cognitivism. The central tool and guiding metaphor of cognitivism is the digital computer . A computer is a physical device built in such a way that a particular set of its physical changes can be interpreted as computations . A computation is an operation performed or carried out on symbols, that is, on elements that represent what they stand for. (For example, the symbol "7" represents the number 7.) Simplifying for the moment, we can say that cognitivism consists in the hypothesis that cognition-human cognition included-is the manipulation of symbols after the fashion of digital computers. In other words, cognition is mental representation: the mind is thought to operate by manipulating symbols that represent features of the world or represent the world as being a certain way. According to this cognitivist hypothesis, the study of cognition qua mental representation provides the proper domain of cognitive science, a domain held to be independent of neurobiology at one end and sociology and anthropology at the other.

Cognitivism has the virtue of being a well-defined research program, complete with prestigious institutions, journals, applied technology, and international commercial concerns. We refer to it as the center or core of cognitive science because it dominates research to such an extent that it is often simply taken to be cognitive science itself. In the past few years, however, several alternative approaches to cognition have appeared. These approaches diverge from cognitivism along two basic lines of dissent: (1) a critique of symbol processing as the appropriate vehicle for representations, and (2) a critique of the adequacy of the notion of representation as the Archimedes point for cognitive science.

The first alternative, which we call emergence … is typically referred to as connectionism. This name is derived from the idea that many cognitive tasks (such as vision and memory) seem to be handled best by systems made up of many simple components, which, when connected by the appropriate rules, give rise to global behavior corresponding to the desired task. Symbolic processing, however, is localized. Operations on symbols can be specified using only the physical form of the symbols, not their meaning. Of course, it is this feature of symbols that enables one to build a physical device to manipulate them. The disadvantage is that the loss of any part of the symbols or the rules for their manipulation results in a serious malfunction. Connnectionist models generally trade localized, symbolic processing for distributed operations (ones that extend over an entire network of components) and so result in the emergence of global properties resilient to local malfunction. For connectionists a representation consists in the correspondence between such an emergent global state and properties of the world; it is not a function of particular symbols.

The second alternative … is born from a deeper dissatisfaction than the connectionist search for alternatives to symbolic processing. It questions the centrality of the notion that cognition is fundamentally representation. Behind this notion stand three fundamental assumptions. The first is that we inhabit a world with particular properties, such as length, color, movement, sound, etc. The second is that we pick up or recover these properties by internally representing them. The third is that there is a separate subjective "we" who does these things. These three assumptions amount to a strong, often tacit and unquestioned, commitment to realism or objectivism/subjectivism about the way the world is, what we are, and how we come to know the world. Even the most hard-nosed biologist, however, would have to admit that there are many ways that the world is-indeed even many different worlds of experience - depending on the structure of the being involved and the kinds of distinctions it is able to make. And even if we restrict our attention to human cognition, there are many various ways the world can be taken to be.s This nonobjectivist (and at best also nonsubjectivist) conviction is slowly growing in the study of cognition. As yet, however, this alternative orientation does not have a well-established name, for it is more of an umbrella that covers a relatively small group of people working in diverse fields. We propose as a name the term enactive to emphasize the growing conviction that cognition is not the representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs. The enactive approach takes seriously, then, the philosophical critique of the idea that the mind is a mirror of nature but goes further by addressing this issue from within the heartland of science.